> This paper investigates how democratic and non-democratic regimes systematically differ in their policy responses to information disorder. Drawing on data from the GDPD, I examine three hypothesized differences between regime types: (1) **_definition ambiguity_**, where democratic states adopt more explicit, narrow definitions of information disorder concepts while non-democracies employ broader, more ambiguous definitions enabling discretionary enforcement; (2) **_policy type preferences_**, with non-democracies favoring regulatory and legal responses while democracies implement more balanced portfolios including media literacy and civic engagement approaches; and (3) **_liability severity_**, with non-democracies more likely to impose harsh penalties for information disorder violations. I develop original measurement approaches, including a multi-dimensional Definition Ambiguity Index and a structured liability severity assessment framework, to enable comparative analysis and hypothesis testing. Using the V-Dem Electoral Democracy Index to measure regime type, this research provides the first large-scale empirical analysis of how institutional arrangements and leader incentives shape information disorder governance across different political systems. The findings will enhance our understanding of the relationship between regime characteristics and the conceptualization and management of problematic information. ## Prior Work > this section will be online this afternoon